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WHEN CONGRESS ATTACKS THE
FEDERAL COURTS
Mark C. Miller'
I would like to begin by thanking the organizers of this wonderful
conference on judicial independence for inviting me to comment on
the excellent paper presented by Professors Entin and Jensen.' This
paper tells us a great deal about issues surrounding tax legislation and
the Compensation Clause. It is certainly possible that Congress might
attempt to attack the courts through the use of tax legislation, and the
Compensation Clause is certainly one device designed to protect the
courts from such attacks. Clearly, the Compensation Clause helps
ensure judicial independence. I think Professors Entin and Jensen
have given us a strong examination of the intersection of tax law and
the Compensation Clause. Nevertheless, I would like to broaden the
discussion to cover various ways in which Congress can attack the
federal courts when the legislative branch is unhappy with the deci-
sions of the judicial branch. Specifically, Congress can use its com-
pensation power, appropriation power, and impeachment power to
demonstrate Congress's disapproval of a judicial decision.
I agree with Professors Entin and Jensen that the Supreme
Court, in United States v. Hatter,2 stated that judges should pay
nondiscriminatory taxes just like all other citizens. These
nondiscriminatory taxes do not raise Compensation Clause issues. As
the Court stated in Hatter, "In practice, the likelihood that a
nondiscriminatory tax represents a disguised legislative effort to
influence the judicial will is virtually nonexistent., 3 I also agree that
the Court attempted to settle the constitutional question that
discriminatory taxes would violate the Compensation Clause. It is
t Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Government and International
Relations; Director of the Law and Society Program, at Clark University in Worcester,
Massachusetts.
' Jonathan L. Entin & Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, Compensation, and Judicial Independ-
ence, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965 (2006).
2 United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001).
3 Id. at 571.
1015
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
worth repeating the statement written by Justice Breyer for the Court:
"In our view, the Clause does not prevent Congress from imposing a
'non-discriminatory tax laid generally' upon judges and other
citizens, but it does prohibit taxation that singles out judges for
specially unfavorable treatment.",4 In other words, the Compensation
Clause, according to the Court, prevents Congress from imposing
discriminatory taxes on federal judges. Where I disagree with
Professors Entin and Jensen, however, is that the Supreme Court has
issued the last word on the subject. Although it seems highly unlikely,
I do think it is possible that Congress could refuse to accept the
Court's pronouncement that tax legislation specifically aimed at
federal judges is unconstitutional. It may be an extremely remote
possibility, but I believe that someday a determined majority in
Congress might attempt to use the tax laws to punish federal judges
with whom they disagree.
The Entin and Jensen paper is a very important example of a rela-
tively new field of scholarship that examines the interactions among
the political institutions, and especially the interactions between the
federal courts and other bodies.5 I do not believe that the federal
courts can be understood in isolation, but instead scholars must at-
tempt to understand the relationships between and among the institu-
tions of government. Two scholars have articulated:
As a matter of constitutional design, the United States simply
does not feature a hierarchy of lawmakers or compartmental-
ized niches for each branch of government. Instead, the U.S.
Constitution creates a system of overlapping and diversely
representative branches of government, which share and
6
compete for power.
4 Id. at 561 (citing O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277,282 (1939)).
5 See JEB BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND COURT-
CONGRESS RELATIONS IN AN AGE OF STATUTES (2004); CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION
(Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005); CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE COURT (Colton
C. Campbell & John F. Stack, Jr. eds., 2001); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES
(1988); JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988); GEORGE I. LOVELL,
LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2003); MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW (Jeb Barnes & Mark C. Miller eds.,
2004); J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS (2004).
6 Jeb Barnes & Mark C. Miller, Governance as Dialogue, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING
LAW, supra note 5, at 202.
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Or put more simply, as Richard Neustadt has argued, in reality, in our
system of government, we have "separated institutions sharing pow-
ers."
7
I am a strong advocate of the governance as dialogue school of
thought that says that the Supreme Court does not necessarily have
the final say on issues of constitutionality. 8 Instead, I agree with Wil-
liam Eskridge9 and others that one could think of the relationship
among the federal courts, the Congress, and the executive as a multi-
player game in which no institution has the "last word," but that is-
sues of constitutionality play themselves out in a continuous colloquy
or dialogue. As Louis Fisher has argued, "An open dialogue between
Congress and the courts is a more fruitful avenue for constitutional
interpretation than simply believing that the judiciary possesses supe-
rior skills and authority."' 0 In a different work, Fisher has also ex-
pressed his belief that, "Although the Supreme Court periodically
announces that it has the 'final word' on constitutional law, the reality
has always been quite different."" Fisher argues that scholars should
explore not only how the courts interact with Congress, but also with
the President, executive branch agencies, the states, interest groups,
the legal academic community, and the public at large. 12 Thus, al-
though the Supreme Court may appear to give final rulings on such
issues as to whether the Compensation Clause allows discriminatory
taxes against federal judges, the reality is that the process of deter-
mining constitutionality is not that simple.
The relationship between Congress and the federal courts is cer-
tainly highly complex and often strained. In fact, at the beginning of
the twenty-first century we may be experiencing one of the greatest
periods of conflicts between Congress and the courts. As Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist stated in his 2004 Annual Report, "Criticism of judges
has dramatically increased in recent years, exacerbating in some re-
spects the strained relationship between the Congress and the federal
7 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM
FDR TO CARTER 26 (1980).
8 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 240 (1962).
9 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation De-
cisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (analyzing the effects of Congress's ability to override Su-
preme Court decisions); William N. Eskridge, Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613 (1991) (discussing the roles
of the President and the Supreme Court in statutory interpretation and how these roles affect
statutory policy).
10 LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1051 (6th ed. 2005).
1 Louis Fisher, Judicial Finality or an Ongoing Colloquy?, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING
LAW, supra note 5, at 153.
12 FISHER, supra note 10, at 1023; see also, Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in
American History, 18 VAND. L. REv. 925 (1965).
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judiciary."' 13 Other eras of high tension between Congress and the
federal courts have included the 1858-1869 period,' 4 the early part of
the 1900s,' 5 the 1930s,l 6 and the late 1950s. 17 In fact, following the
Civil War, the Radical Republicans in Congress enacted a statute to
require a two-thirds majority of the Court before the justices could
declare any federal statute unconstitutional. They were attempting to
protect the Reconstruction Acts from being struck down as unconsti-
tutional. Progressives in the early part of the twentieth century also
proposed requiring a two-thirds vote of the justices of the Supreme
Court before the Court could declare a congressional statute to be
unconstitutional, and they proposed that a two-thirds vote in Congress
could override Supreme Court constitutional decisions.'
8
But the current period may be the most contentious in the relation-
ship between the courts and Congress. As Lyle Denniston, who has
been a journalist covering the Supreme Court for many years, has said
recently, "In 56 years of journalism, most of which has been spent
hanging around lawyers and courthouses, I have never experienced
the depth of venom that now flows around the relationship between
the branches of government, particularly around the judiciary."' 9
Similarly, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in 2004 echoed that the rela-
tionship between Congress and the federal courts was "more tense
than at any time in my lifetime.,
20
13 WILIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (2004),
available at http:llwww.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2004year-endreport.pdf.
14 See Nagel, supra note 12. The 1858-1869 tensions reflected the congressional reaction
to the Dred Scott decision and congressional efforts to prevent the Court from declaring the
Reconstruction to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
1S In the 1900s, Progressives were angry at the conservative judicial activism of the Court
in reading laissez-faire economics into the Constitution and thus striking down most attempts at
governmental regulation of the economy. Nagel, supra note 12. In fact, Senator Robert M.
LaFollette referred to federal judges at the time as "petty tyrants and arrogant despots." GARY L.
McDOWELL, CURBING THE COURT 1 (1988).
16 In this era, FDR and the Congress were angry that the New Deal was being declared
unconstitutional. Nagel, supra note 12; see also JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER & LARRY L. BERG,
THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS, 1945-1968, at 134-42 (1972) (discussing Roosevelt's
proposed court-packing plan and its potential political backlash).
17 During the late 1950s, conservatives were upset with Supreme Court decisions dealing
with desegregation, congressional investigations, national security, and other issues. Nagel,
supra note 12; see also LUCAS A POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS
127-205 (2000) (providing an in-depth discussion of attempted Congressional anti-court bills
during the late 1950s).
18 DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
357-58 (6th ed. 2003).
19 Colloquium, The Courts, the Legislature, and the Executive, Separate and Equal?
Issues at the Federal Level, 87 JUDICATURE 220, 221 (2004).
20 Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes His Call for Judicial Independence, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A10.
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Part of this tension between the courts and Congress may be due to
the fact that the Rehnquist Court practiced both liberal judicial activ-
ism and conservative judicial activism 2' simultaneously, leading to
what Keck has labeled, The Most Activist Supreme Court in History.22
In fact, from 1995-2003, the Court struck down federal statutes at a
rate higher than in any other period in U.S. history.23 The conflicts
between Congress and the courts are not new, but the current period
seems to be accentuating these tensions. Since I do not believe that
the Supreme Court always has the last word on constitutional issues,
it is important for the Court to appreciate the potential institutional
dangers that can come from an angry Congress. Again, Louis Fisher
has written that,
Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has understood
that its "independence" relies on an astute appreciation of
how dependent the judiciary is on the political system for un-
derstanding, supporting, and implementing judicial rulings.
The Court has an opportunity to exercise leadership and crea-
tivity, but the risk of a political backlash is always around the
corner.
24
The courts and Congress have different institutional cultures, dif-
ferent institutional needs, and different institutional wills.25 Many of
21 When political scientists use the term "judicial activism," they tend to use the term as a
descriptive term and not generally as a pejorative. For political scientists, judicial activism
simply means that the courts make public policy when the elected branches cannot or will not.
As Holland defines it,
Judicial activism comes into existence when courts do not confine themselves to ad-
judication of legal conflicts but adventure to make social policies, affecting thereby
many more people and interests than if they had confined themselves to the resolu-
tion of narrow disputes. The activism of a court, thus, can be measured by the degree
of power that it exercises over citizens, the legislature, and the administration.
Kenneth M. Holland, Introduction, in JuDIcIAL AcrivIsM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 1
(Kenneth M. Holland ed., 1991).
Judicial activism in the U.S. context also means that the judges are willing to interpret the
U.S. Constitution as a living and changing document. Thus, any time that the American courts
declare an action of the elected branches to be unconstitutional, they are exercising judicial
activism in the political science sense of the term. The ideological direction of the activism
leads to the labeling of the action as either liberal judicial activism or conservative judicial
activism. THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY (2004).
22 KECK, supra note 21.
23 Id. at 40.
24 Fisher, supra note 11, at 153.
25 See Mark C. Miller, The View of the Courts from the Hill: A Neoinstitutional Perspec-
tive, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW, supra note 5, at 53 (describing these different wills in
terms of both individual and institutional behaviors) [hereinafter, Miller, The View of the
Courts]; Mark C. Miller, Interactions Between Legislatures and Courts, 87 JUDICATURE 213,
213 (2004) (arguing that this produces conflict because each branch "misunderstands the needs,
the views, and the institutional realities of the other").
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the interactions between the courts and Congress are positive in na-
ture,26 but others are more conflictual. Judges see themselves as an
independent and coequal branch of government, but sometimes Con-
gress views the courts as just one more federal agency begging for
money and other resources, as will be discussed in more detail later in
the article. Thus, the two institutions often just do not understand how
and why the other makes decisions. As Davidson and Oleszek note,
"Communications between Congress and the federal courts are less
than perfect. Neither branch understands the workings of the other
very well. 27 This lack of communication between the branches is
clearly a problem for our political system. Judge Robert A. Katzmann
remind us of what political scientists have been saying for years:
"Governance . . . is premised on each institution's respect for and
knowledge of the others and on a continuing dialogue that produces
shared understanding and comity.'' 28 And as Michael H. Armacost,
former president of the Brookings Institution, has written, "The judi-
ciary seeks an environment respectful of its independence. Congress
seeks a judicial system that faithfully construes the laws of the legis-
lative branch and efficiently discharges justice. '" 29
I. CONGRESS'S COMPENSATION POWER
There have been many instances in which Congress has used vari-
ous mechanisms to attack the federal courts for decisions with which
a determined legislative majority has disagreed.3° While to my
knowledge Congress has not yet deliberately defied the protections
inherent in the Compensation Clause, the legislative branch has used
other means to attack the courts and to attempt to influence court de-
cisions. Even though the Compensation Clause prevents Congress
from reducing any judicial salaries that have already vested, 31 the
clause neither requires Congress to provide any annual cost of living
26 See, e.g., Colloquium, supra note 19, at 221 (noting positive examples of the three
branches working together); Judith Resnik et al., The Independence of the Federal Judiciary,
BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & Scl, Winter 2004, at 22; Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction
as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article I11, 113 HARv. L. REV. 924 (2000) [hereinafter
Resnick, Trial as Error].
27 ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 343 (8th
ed. 2002).
28 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 1 (1997).
29 Id. at vii.
30 It is interesting to note that members of Congress with law degrees tend to be more
supportive of the courts than are the nonlawyer members. See MARK C. MILLER, THE HIGH
PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS (1995).
31 See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
1020 [Vol. 56:4
2006] WHEN CONGRESS AITTACKS THE FEDERAL COURTS
adjustments for federal judges nor prevents Congress from canceling
future announced judicial salary increases. 32 Thus, judicial salaries
have always been a point of contention, and Congress has sometimes
used judicial salaries to send a clear message to the courts. For exam-
ple, in 1964, Congress increased the salaries for lower federal judges
by $7,500 per year but increased the salaries for Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court by only $4,500 per year. As Schmidhauser and Berg
explain, "The $3,000 differential clearly reflected a direct Congres-
sional reprimand to the Supreme Court. This crude rebuff clearly
stemmed from congressional dissatisfaction with several controversial
decisions rendered by the Court.
33
Clearly, judicial salary issues have added to the tensions between
the courts and Congress. Federal judges often feel that Congress does
not provide adequate compensation for them. As Professor Paul M.
Bator has remarked, "federal judges, as a group, complain more about
their pay than any other group I have ever encountered." 34 There is
probably a great deal of truth to the fact that federal judges feel that
they are underpaid. In 2003, Judges Coffin and Katzmann noted that,
"Since 1969, federal judicial salaries have lost twenty-four percent of
their purchasing power., 35 Various congressional actions regarding
annual cost of living adjustments for federal judges have not made
federal judges feel better about their financial situations. For example,
in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999, Congress blocked previously an-
nounced "automatic" cost of living increases for various governmen-
tal officials, including federal judges, that had been provided for in
the Ethics Reform Act of 1989.36 Congress was really attempting to
prevent the automatic pay raises for its own members from going into
effect, but the legislation blocked federal judicial pay increases as
well as the pay raises for legislators. When federal judges sued to
32 "To say that Congress could not alter a method of calculating salaries before it was exe-
cuted would mean the Judicial Branch could command Congress to carry out an announced
future intent as to a decision the Constitution vests exclusively in Congress." Id. at 228; see also
Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 911 (2002)
(examining Congress's cancellation of annual cost of living increases that were proposed but
never vested).
33 JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER & LARRY L. BERG, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS 8
(1972).
34 Paul M. Bator, The Judicial Universe of Judge Richard Posner, U. Cm. L. REV. 1146,
1148 (1985).
35 Frank M. Coffin & Robert A. Katzmann, Steps Towards Optimal Judicial Workways:
Perspectives from the Federal Bench, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 377, 384 (2003) (citing
NAT'L COMM'N ON PUB. SERv., URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA: REVITALIZING THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 22 (2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu/gs/
cps/voIcker/reportfmal.pdf).
36 Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 2, 5, 10, 18, 26, 31 U.S.C.).
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recover their blocked "automatic" pay increases, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the proposed
"automatic" pay raises had not vested, and thus, there was no viola-
tion of the Compensation Clause in the legislative actions. 3 7 Although
the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in the case, Justice
Breyer wrote a strongly worded dissent to the denial of certiorari,
which Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined.38 This concern with judi-
cial salaries and other budgetary resources is not new, of course. Al-
though he was speaking more broadly of his frustration with congres-
sional budgeting practices, Chief Justice Warren stated in 1969 that,
"It is next to impossible for the courts to get something from Con-
gress. "
39
In his annual year-end reports on the State of the Judiciary, Chief
Justice Rehnquist often complained about Congress's approach to
judicial salary issues. In his 2000 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, Chief Justice Rehnquist focused most of the report on what
he termed, "the most pressing issue facing the Judiciary: the need to
increase judicial salaries." 40 The Chief Justice went on to say,
[I]n order to continue to provide the nation a capable and ef-
fective judicial system we must be able to attract and retain
experienced men and women of quality and diversity to per-
form a demanding position in the public service. The fact is
that those lawyers who are qualified to serve as federal judges
have opportunities to earn far more in private law practice or
business than as judges. In order to continue to attract highly
37 Williams, 240 F.3d at 1019.
38 Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911 (2002) (Breyer, J. dissenting). Concerning the
goals of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Justice Breyer wrote:
IT]he Act sought to maintain real judicial compensation at a nearly constant level.
The Quadrennial Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries had
told Congress that a continuous inflation-driven reduction in the real level ofjudicial
salaries, at a time when most other real salaries in America had remained constant or
increased, was "threatening to diminish the quality of justice in this country .. "
And the Congressional Bipartisan Task Force on Ethics had added that "Federal
judges are resigning at a higher rate than ever before." Failure to protect against the
negative impact of inflation, the task force stated, was "the single, most important
explanation" for the increasing disparity between the salaries of high-level Govern-
ment officials and comparable positions in the private sector. Hence, the Act focused
on inflation, assuring federal judges (as well as Members of Congress and high-level
Executive Branch officials) that their real salaries, compared to those of the average
worker, would decline only slightly, if at all.
Id. at 911-12 (citations omitted).
39 Earl Warren, ChiefJustice Earl Warren's Address to the Bar Association of the District
of Columbia, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1969, at Al, A4.
40 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2000 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (2000),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2000year-endreport.html.
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qualified and diverse federal judges-judges whom we ask
and expect to remain for life-we must provide them ade-
quate compensation. 41
In a quite lengthy discussion of the subject, the Chief Justice also
noted that judicial salary issues had been discussed in thirteen of the
last nineteen end-of-year reports on the state of the judiciary.42 In his
2002 Annual Report, the Chief Justice reiterated the same sentiment:
"At the risk of beating a dead horse, I will reiterate what I have said
many times over the years about the need to compensate judges
fairly. ' '43 Judicial salary issues remain important to the Supreme Court
and to all federal judges. In his first annual report, Chief Justice Rob-
erts also raised the judicial salary issue:
A more direct threat to judicial independence is the failure to
raise judges' pay. If judges' salaries are too low, judges effec-
tively serve for a term dictated by their financial position
rather than for life. Figures gathered by the Administrative
Office show that judges are leaving the bench in greater
numbers now than ever before.44
II. CONGRESS'S APPROPRIATIONS POWER
More generally, overall appropriations for the judicial branch have
been a source of conflict and concern between Congress and the fed-
eral courts.45 In addition to judicial salaries, the federal courts depend
upon Congress for funds for new judgeships, courthouses, staff, tech-
nology, and a variety of other purposes. As I have written previously,
"The annual appropriations process provides a clear avenue to see the
different institutional perspectives of the Supreme Court and of Con-
gress. The courts rightly see themselves as an independent third
branch, and many judges seem to resent Congress's interference with
their budget requests." 46 Congress, however, often views the federal
41 Id. at ll.
42 Id.
43 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2002 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY IV
(2002), available at http://www.supremecourus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2002year-endreport.html.
44 JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2005 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3-4
(2005), available at http://supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-endl/2005year-endreport.pdf.
45 See, e.g., BARBARA A. PERRY, THE PRIESTLY TRIBE: THE SUPREME COURT'S IMAGE IN
THE AMERICAN MIND 144 (1999) (noting that the court started out in the "potato hole"); Harvey
Rishikof & Barbara A. Perry, Separateness but Interdependence, Autonomy but Reciprocity: A
First Look at Federal Judges' Appearances Before Legislative Committees, 46 MERCER L. REV.
667 (1995) (arguing that Justices usually only appear before Congress for budgetary concerns).
46 Barnes & Miller, supra note 6, at 64.
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courts as just one more federal agency begging for funds.47 When it
comes to the annual appropriations process, it seems that Congress
does not consider the fact that the courts are a coequal third branch to
be of any significance in its deliberations. As a former chair of the
House Appropriations subcommittee with jurisdiction over the budget
for the judicial branch explained,
The courts do not have many advocates in Congress. They do
not have a constituency. Congress continues to pass more and
more laws that require the courts to assume jurisdiction of
more cases and add to their workload. Congress is eager to
authorize more judges, but when it comes to paying for them,
the members of Congress do not think that is a very high
priority.48
On one small point concerning the appropriations process in
Congress, I also disagree with the Entin and Jensen paper. Professors
Entin and Jensen seem surprised that Congress might enact certain
policies without a clear paper trail.49 It is quite easy, however, under
current congressional procedures for a member of a conference
committee (at least one who is a member of the majority party in the
chamber) to add provisions that are difficult to trace. It is quite
common for odd riders to be inserted into legislation at the conference
committee without any clear paper trail about where the provisions
originated or who was the sponsor of the rider. ° Such phantom
provisions can also be added through creative rules proposed by the
House Rules Committee.51 Therefore, it is not impossible for a
member to include legislative language that attempts to influence
court decisions without publicly acknowledging that action.
Oleszek, in his seminal work on congressional procedures, con-
firms that minority party members of the conference committee may
have no input into the bargaining and negotiation process in confer-
ence committees.52 As evidence of the way that the majority party can
47 See, e.g., Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 26, at 1011.
48 NEAL SMITH, MR. SMITH WENT TO WASHINGTON 177 (1996).
49 Entin & Jensen, supra note 1, at 998.
50 WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 255-57
(6th ed. 2003).
5' DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 27, at 240-44.
52 OLESZEK, supra note 50, at 255-57. Oleszek even quotes Democratic Senator Richard
Durbin (D-ll.) as stating,
I have been appointed to conference committees in the Senate in name only.... where my
name will be read by the [presiding officer] and only the conference committee of Repub-
licans goes off and meets, adopts a conference report, signs it, and sends it back to the
floor without even inviting me to attend a session.
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2006] WHEN CONGRESS ATTACKS THE FEDERAL COURTS
insert legislative provisions in bills without public scrutiny, especially
in conference committees, the Democratic Party's January 2006 lob-
bying reform plan included proposed changes to the potential secrecy
that can happen in the legislative process. As the Washington Post
reported,
Under the Democrats' plan, House and Senate negotiators
working out final versions of legislation would have to meet
in open session, with all members of the conference commit-
tee-not just Republicans-having the opportunity to vote on
amendments. Legislation would have to be posted publicly 24
hours before congressional consideration.53
Frustration with the annual appropriations process for the courts
has created some interesting reactions from federal judges. For exam-
ple, during the fiscal year 2000 budget cycle, the Senate voted to cut
$280 million from the $4.3 billion that the federal judiciary had re-
quested that year. In an extraordinary step, Chief Justice Rehnquist
sent a letter to the then Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.),
calling the Senate actions "unjustified and impractical. 54 Many
newspapers around the country ran editorials condemning the pro-
posed budget cuts. Eventually, most but not all of the requested funds
were approved by the Congress. In some ways, the fiscal year 2004
appropriations process was even more difficult for the federal courts.
Congress missed its October 2003 deadline for enacting the judici-
ary's budget, and when the budget did pass, it included several fund-
ing cuts. As Chief Justice Rehnquist described the situation, "The
continuing uncertainties and delays in the funding process have ne-
cessitated substantial effort on the part of judges and judiciary man-
agers and staff to modify budget systems, develop contingency plans,
cancel activities, and attempt to cut costs. '55 The fiscal year 2005
appropriation for the judiciary was $5.42 billion, some $300 million
below the request from the third branch.
56
Id.
3 Jonathan Weisman, Democrats Unveil Lobbying Curbs; As Party Escalates Reform
Push, GOP Calls Scandal Bipartisan, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2006, at Al.
s4 Richard Carelli, Rehnquist Lobbies Congress for Money, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRE, Aug. 10, 1999.
55 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2003 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (2003),
available at http:lwww/supremecourtus.gov/publicinfolyear-end/2003year-endreport.htn-l.
56 Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes His Call for Judicial Independence, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at AI0.
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Concerns over the annual appropriations process led Chief Justice
Roberts to also argue that the independence of the courts is under
attack. He wrote in his 2005 annual report, "In recent years, the
budget for the federal judiciary and the ever-lengthening appropria-
tions process have taken a toll on the operations of the courts. 57 The
Chief Justice went on to complain about the overly high rents that the
judicial branch pays to the federal General Services Administration
for courthouses and other office space. He continued, "Escalating
rents combined with across-the-board cuts imposed during fiscal
years 2004 and 2005 resulted in a reduction of approximately 1,500
judicial branch employees as of mid-December [2005] when com-
pared to October 2003."58 At this point, it is worth quoting the new
Chief Justice at some length on his views of the intersection of judi-
cial independence and the appropriations process:
The federal judiciary, as one of the three coordinate branches
of government, makes only modest requests of the other
branches with respect to funding its vital mission of preserving
the rule of law under our Constitution. Those of us in the judi-
ciary understand the challenges our country faces and the
many competing interests that must be balanced in funding our
national priorities. But the courts play an essential role in en-
suring that we live in a society governed by the rule of law, in-
cluding the Constitution's guarantees of individual liberty. In
order to preserve the independence of our courts, we must en-
sure that the judiciary is provided the tools to do its job. 59
Some politicians are quite open about advocating that the Congress
use its power of the purse to influence the decisions of the federal
courts. Former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) said in
the spring of 2005 after the Schiavo controversy,
I have asked the Judiciary Committee to look at the Schiavo
case and the actions of the judiciary. . . . The legislative
branch has certain responsibilities and obligations given to us
by the Constitution. We set the jurisdiction of the courts. We
set up the courts. We can unset the courts. We have the power
of the purse.60
57 ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 2.
58 Id. at 3.
59 Id. at 5.
60 Rick Klein, DeLay Apologizes for Blaming Federal Judges in Schiavo Case, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 14, 2005 at A9.
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Some conservatives in Congress had become so angry with a host
of what they perceive to be improperly liberal activist decisions of the
federal courts and especially the U.S. Supreme Court, that in 2003
they created a new House caucus on judicial accountability. Accord-
ing to a press release issued by the new organization, this new House
Working Group on Judicial Accountability will educate members of
Congress and the public about judicial abuses, especially judi-
cial activism.6 1 Congressman Steve Chabot (R-Ohio), a founding
member of the Working Group, defined judicial activism in the fol-
lowing way: "Judicial activism occurs when judges exceed the au-
thority given to them under Article III of the Constitution. When
judges substitute their own political views for the law, the ramifica-
tions can be felt by communities across our nation. 62 Former Minor-
ity Leader of the House Tom DeLay (D-Tex.) said at the time, "When
it comes to judicial abuses, they're going to take no prisoners. 63
Founding members of the new Working Group later introduced legis-
lation to require that a two-thirds vote in both houses could override
any constitutional decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that struck
down a federal statute as unconstitutional. 64
III. CONGRESS'S IMPEACHMENT POWER
In addition to using its power of the purse to influence court deci-
sions, some politicians have called for the impeachment of federal
judges with whom they disagree. Historically, impeachment has not
been used to remove federal judges from the bench merely because a
majority of Congress disagrees with a judge's decisions. Impeach-
ment for purely political purposes has been seen as improper since the
Senate refused to remove Justice Samuel Chase from the Court in
1803, even though he was impeached by the House as a result of the
members' strong opposition to his decisions.65 But calls for impeach-
61 Press Release, Congressman Lamar Smith, Smith & Chabot Form Judicial Accountabil-
ity Group (July 23, 2003), available at http://lamarsmith,house.gov/News.asp?FormMode=
List&ID=-l.
62 Id.
63 Administrative Office of the Federal Courts, Judiciary Under Attack, 35 THE THIRD
BRANCH 8 (2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/aug03ttb/attack.
64 Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of 2004, H.R. 3920, 108th
Cong. (2004), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/dl08/dl081aws.htm; Press Release, Con-
gressman Ron Lewis, Accountability for Judicial Activism Act in the House (Mar. 9, 2004) (on
file with Congressman Lewis).
65 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992); Mary L. Volcansek,
Separation of Powers and Judicial Impeachment, in CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE COURTS, supra
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ment of federal judges for purely ideological reasons have grown
stronger lately. Following the Schiavo controversy, in which Con-
gress attempted to force the federal courts to prevent the removal of a
feeding tube from Ms. Terri Schiavo even though every court that
considered the issue ruled that Ms. Schiavo's husband had the right to
request removal of the tube, many conservatives called for the im-
peachment of judges who refused to follow their preferred ideological
views. For example, former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay has
been quoted as saying, "Judicial independence does not equal judicial
supremacy." 66 He did not rule out impeaching judges, because the
current situation depends on "a judiciary run amok." 67 He continued,
"The failure is to a great degree Congress's .... The response of the
legislative branch has mostly been to complain. There is another way,
ladies and gentlemen, and that is to reassert our constitutional author-
ity over the courts. . . . This era of constitutional cowardice must
end. 68 Michael Schwartz, then chief of staff to Senator Tom Coburn
(R-Okla.), said, "I'm in favor of impeachment," even suggesting that
"mass impeachment" of federal judges might be in order.69 Conserva-
tive activist Phyllis Schlafy even called for the impeachment of con-
servative U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy for his
opinion that the Court should forbid the death penalty for juveniles.7 °
Various other conservative activists at a conference entitled, "Reme-
dies to Judicial Tyranny," organized by a group called Judeo-
Christian Council for Constitutional Restoration agreed. 1 Michael P.
Farris, chair of the Home School Legal Defense Association, stated at
the conference, "If about 40 [federal judges] get impeached, suddenly
a lot of these guys would be retiring. 72 In addition to Congressman
Tom DeLay, Senators Rich Santorum (R-Pa.) and John Cornyn (R-
Tex.) have not ruled out using impeachment as a tool in order to in-
fluence federal court decisions.73 Although stating that he does not
support impeachment of federal judges for ideological reasons, House
Judiciary Committee Chair F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-Wis.) has
note 5, at 37.
6 Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says Federal Judiciary Has 'Run Amok,'








73 See Ruth Marcus, Boot the Bench: There's New Ferocity in Talk of Firing Activist
Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2005, at A19.
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called for an inspector general to oversee the courts and to conduct
investigations into the issue of judges overreaching their constitu-
74tional powers.
Such calls for impeachment of federal judges have produced a re-
sponse from those who worry about threats to the independence of the
federal judiciary. The New York Times ran an editorial on April 5,
2005, denouncing these attacks on the judiciary. The Times' editorial
stated, "Through public attacks, proposed legislation, and even the
threat of impeachment, ideologues are trying to bully judges into fol-
lowing their political line. Mr. DeLay and his allies have moved be-
yond ordinary criticism to undermining the separation of powers, not
to mention the rule of law. 75 The Washington Post ran an editorial on
April 1, 2005, condemning among other things, calls for impeach-
ment of federal judges for ideological reasons. The Post's editorial
stated that calls of retribution against judges are "a mark of an arro-
gant and out-of-control federal power-but that power is the legisla-
ture, not the judiciary. '76 The editorial concluded, "This country has
an independent judiciary precisely to shield judges who make difficult
decisions under intense political and time pressure from the bullying
of politicians. ' 77 In his last two end of year reports, Chief Justice
Rehnquist repeated his belief that federal judges cannot be impeached
for political reasons. After expressing concerns about attempts by
Congress to gather information on the sentencing practices of indi-
vidual judges, in his 2003 year-end report Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded:
For side-by-side with the broad authority of Congress to leg-
islate and gather information in this area is the principle that
federal judges are not to be removed from office for their ju-
dicial acts. The subject matter of the questions Congress may
pose about judges' decisions, and whether they target the ju-
dicial decisions of individual federal judges, could appear to
be an unwarranted and ill-considered effort to intimidate in-
dividual judges in the performance of their judicial duties.78
In his final year-end report, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded,
74 Mike Allen, GOP Seeks More Curbs on Courts: Sensenbrenner Proposes an Inspector
General, WASH. POST, May 12, 2005, at A3.
75 Editorial, Attacking a Free Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2005, at A22.
76 Editorial, This Is Not the Way, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2005, at A26.
77 Id.
78 REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at IL
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No doubt the federal Judiciary, including the Supreme Court,
will continue to encounter challenges to its independence and
authority because of dissatisfaction with particular decisions
or the general direction of its jurisprudence. Let us hope that
the Supreme Court and all of our courts will continue to
command sufficient public respect to enable them to survive
basic attacks on the judicial independence that has made our
judicial system a model for much of the world. 9
IV. CONCLUSION
There are of course other examples of ways that a determined ma-
jority in Congress can attack the independence of the federal judici-
ary. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail some of
the other mechanisms that could be used by Congress to attack the
federal courts. For example, this paper has discussed neither court
packing plans, such as those advocated by President Franklin Roose-
velt,80 nor various plans to prevent federal courts from hearing certain
types of cases, commonly referred to as court-stripping proposals.8'
Other actions that Congress could take include proposals to divide up
the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in response to the particular
ideological path taken by that court. 82 Certainly, a determined major-
ity in Congress can find other innovative avenues for attacking the
courts.
It is clear that the federal courts and Congress have radically dif-
ferent institutional cultures and wills. These different institutional
wills and institutional perspectives mean that the two branches usu-
ally do not understand the other's decision-making process very well.
For the sake of the rule of law, we need to know more about the inter-
actions and relationships between these two governmental bodies.
The Entin and Jensen paper takes an important step closer to reaching
that level of knowledge.
79 REHNQUIST, supra note 13, at 8.
80 See, e.g., Michael Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process as Constitutional Inter-
pretation, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 110; O'BRIEN, supra note 18,
at 55-64 (discussing President Roosevelt's attempts to pack the Courts with politically compati-
ble justices).
81 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 10, at 1036-45 (discussing the constitutional arguments in
support of and in opposition to various court-stripping proposals); O'BRIEN, supra note 18, at
356-60 (examining Congress's threat to remove the Court's jurisdiction over disputes involving
states' rights).
82 See, e.g., Miller, The View of the Courts, supra note 25, at 53; Martin Kasindorf, The
Court Conservatives Hate, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 7, 2003, at 3A.
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